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Introduction: In hospital settings, patient isolation is used to limit transmission of certain pathogens (e.g. M. tuberculosis
[TB], antibiotic-resistant bacteria and viruses causing respiratory and enteric infection). Data is lacking on utilization of
paediatric isolation facilities in low-resource, TB-endemic settings.
Methods: Prospective weekday observation of 18 paediatric isolation rooms at Tygerberg Children’s Hospital, Cape Town,
South Africa, was conducted between 1 May 2014 and 31 October 2014 documenting: occupancy rate; indication for
isolation; duration of isolation; application of transmission-based precautions and infection prevention (IPC) behaviour of
personnel. Potential under-utilization of isolation rooms was determined by cross-referencing isolation room occupancy
with laboratory isolates of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, M. tuberculosis and selected viral pathogens.
Results: Six percent (335/5906) of hospitalized children were isolated: 78 % (260/335) for IPC purposes. Most IPC-isolated
patients had community-acquired infections (213/260; 82 %), including tuberculosis (130/260; 50 %) and suspected viral
infections (75/260; 29 %). Children (median age 17 months [IQR 6–50]) spent 4 days (IQR 2–8) in isolation.
Isolation occupancy was 66 % (2172/3294 occupied bed days), but varied significantly by month. Laboratory
data identified an additional 135 patients warranting isolation with 2054 extra bed-days required. Forty patients with
171 patient days of inappropriate isolation were identified. During 1223 weekday visits to IPC-isolated patient rooms:
alcohol-based handrub was available (89 %); transmission-based precautions were appropriately implemented (71 %);
and personal protective equipment was provided (74 %). Of 358 observed interactions between paediatric staff and
isolated patients, hand hygiene compliance was 65 % and adherence to transmission-based precautions was 58 %.
Conclusion: Patients isolated for TB (under airborne precautions) accounted for more than half of all isolation episodes.
Missed opportunities for patient isolation were common but could be reduced by implementation of syndromic isolation.
Demand for isolation facilities was seasonal, with projected demand exceeding available isolation beds over
winter months.
Keywords: Paediatrics, Healthcare-associated infection, Nosocomial infection, Infection control, Patient isolation,
Transmission-based precautions, TuberculosisBackground
Standard and transmission-based precautions (contact,
droplet and airborne) [1] are used to interrupt pathogen
transmission in healthcare settings. Patient isolation is a
key component of these precautions, targeting pathogens
such as M. tuberculosis (TB), antibiotic-resistant bacteria
and certain viruses. Despite widespread implementation of
these precautions in high-income countries, the resources* Correspondence: dramowski@sun.ac.za
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based precaution recommendations are lacking in many
low and middle income countries [2, 3].
In paediatric wards, where infectious disease related-
admissions predominate, the demand for isolation beds
may be ten-fold greater than for hospitalized adults [4].
Not only are hospitalized children more likely to transmit
infection, they are also at elevated risk for healthcare-
associated infection (HAI) owing to immunological imma-
turity, underdeveloped mucosal barriers and increased
handling by healthcare staff [5]. Studies of isolation facility
usage in high-income settings report that 5-17 % ofticle is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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for community-acquired infections (60–75 %) [4, 6–8].
Marked seasonality in demand for paediatric isolation beds
(with demand often exceeding supply) is reported even
from facilities with more single rooms than cohort beds [4,
6, 7]. The most common precaution type implemented in
paediatric studies [5, 8, 9] is contact precautions (80–90 %)
followed by droplet precautions [6]. A single study [6]
measured correct use of isolation room precaution
signage (93 %) and availability of personal protective
equipment (100 %). Staff compliance with hand hygiene
and transmission-based precautions recommendations
in paediatric isolation rooms was not evaluated in these
studies.
The impact of absent or limited paediatric isolation
facilities in low-middle income settings is unquantified,
but undoubtedly promotes infection transmission, along
with adverse health system factors like overcrowding
and lack of IPC provisions [3]. Data on rates of patient
isolation, indications for and utilization patterns of
paediatric isolation facilities in Africa is lacking. We
evaluated isolation facility utilization and transmission-
based precaution implementation at a paediatric referral
hospital in a TB-endemic setting in Cape Town, South
Africa.
Methods
Setting and patient profile
The Tygerberg Children’s Hospital (TCH) in Cape Town,
South Africa has 300 paediatric beds within the 1384-
bed academic hospital complex. Sick neonates, infants
and children (0–14 years) from Cape Town’s Metropole
East are hospitalized in 13 neonatal and paediatric wards
(including surgical, general medical, sub-specialty wards
and intensive care). Admissions reflect a high burden of
infectious disease with TB, lower respiratory tract infec-
tions and gastroenteritis predominating. HIV prevalence
in paediatric inpatients is approximately 15 %; antiretro-
viral therapy is widely available and improved access to
prevention of mother-to-child HIV infection transmission
programmes (PMTCT) has reduced national vertical HIV
transmission rates to 2.4 % in 2012 [9]. Immunisation
coverage rates were 88 % in infants under 12 months of
age in 2012 [10].
Patient isolation in our context implies placement of a
patient in a single room with application of transmission-
based precautions based on clinical indication. Five paedi-
atric wards have 18 single rooms available for patient
isolation (9 under negative pressure; only 3 with en-suite
bathrooms; none have ante-rooms). This represents 14 %
of the available beds on the five wards: 1 room in acute
admissions, 3 in paediatric surgery, 2 in general paediat-
rics, 2 in pulmonology/neurology and 10 in the infectious
diseases/gastroenterology ward. The paediatric intensivecare unit (PICU) has 10 beds in 2 cohort rooms with no
single room or isolation facilities available. PICU patients
were eligible for study inclusion if transferred to any of
the specified wards.
Each ward’s medical and nursing personnel determine
which patients are placed in isolation. Although there is
no formal policy guiding isolation room utilization, pref-
erence is given to patients requiring airborne precau-
tions e.g. pulmonary TB, measles and varicella. Where
possible, children are accompanied by a caregiver (who
may also require isolation e.g. for pulmonary TB).
Syndromic isolation for suspected viral diseases is infre-
quently implemented, owing to clinician unfamiliarity
with the practice and limited isolation space. In contrast,
syndromic isolation for suspected TB is actively practiced,
based on compatible symptoms and signs, history of TB
contact and/or a suggestive chest radiograph appearance.
The hospital’s Unit for Infection Prevention and Control
(IPC) conducts laboratory surveillance for selected bacterial
“alert” pathogens and makes recommendations for patient
isolation on an ad-hoc basis. Infectious patients are usually
isolated until discharge (with the exception of meningococ-
cal disease with de-isolation after 24 h of therapy).
Study design and data collection
Prospective observation of paediatric isolation rooms was
conducted on weekdays from 1 May 2014 to 31 October
2014 documenting: occupancy rates; indication for isola-
tion; duration of patient isolation and application of
transmission-based precautions using the 2007 CDC
patient isolation indications [1]. During weekday visits,
observed interactions between personnel and isolated
patients were documented including compliance with
hand hygiene and transmission-based precautions. Hand
hygiene was scored as compliant if all potential opportun-
ities for hand hygiene were followed, or non-compliant if
all or some opportunities for hand hygiene were missed.
Transmission-based precautions were scored as compliant
if all recommendations and appropriate personal protective
equipment was applied, or non-compliant if all or some
recommendations were not followed. Alcohol handrub and
personal protective equipment was scored as available, if
the handrub and equipment items needed (based on the
appropriate precautions) were supplied at the entrance to
the isolation room.
Estimation of isolation room under-utilization
Two datasets were created: “patient isolation room
utilization data” was collected on weekday ward rounds
using Microsoft Access 2013 and “patients with pathogens
warranting isolation” was extracted from Microbiology
and Virology laboratory databases. Pathogens warranting
isolation [1] included: multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria
[11] from any clinical specimen (blood culture, urine,
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methicillin-resistant S. aureus [MRSA], carbapenem-
resistant A. baumanni [CRAB], MDR P. aeruginosa
[MDR PA] and extended spectrum B-lactamase produ-
cing Enterobacteriaceae [ESBL]; M. tuberculosis both
drug-susceptible (DS) and drug-resistant (DR) isolated
from any respiratory sample (gastric washing and/or
induced sputum) on GeneXpert, smear microscopy or TB
culture; and viruses including enteric (rota and adenovirus,
hepatitis A virus) and respiratory pathogens (respiratory
syncytial virus, adenovirus, human rhinovirus, parainflu-
enza 1/2/3, influenza A/B and human metapneumovirus)
identified by rapid assays, enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assays (ELISA) or polymerase chain reaction (PCR) panel
testing. All laboratory investigations were taken at the dis-
cretion of attending clinicians. Repeated isolates of the
same pathogen from one or more sites counted as a single
infection episode warranting patient isolation.
The laboratory pathogen dataset was cross-referenced
against the patient isolation room utilization dataset.
Several measures of isolation room utilization were calcu-
lated: missed isolation (patients with pathogens warranting
isolation who were not isolated), delayed isolation (patients
with late imposition of isolation precautions), inappropriate
isolation (no clinical indication for isolation; failure to de-
isolate after no pathogens or pathogens not warranting
isolation were identified and failure to de-isolate after
appropriate therapy) and syndromic isolation requirement
(patients with suspected viral infections who were not iso-
lated and had a negative laboratory test results for viralTable 1 Paediatric isolation room utilization
Variable Total
Discrete patient isolation episodes 335
Median patient age (months) 17
Median stay in isolation room (days) 4
Indication for isolation
- infection control (IPC) purposes 260
- nursing care 46
- palliation/privacy 13
- othera 16
Transmission-based precautionsb applied 260
- airborne precautions 136
- droplet precautions 57
- contact precautions 67
Mean
Isolation room occupancy ratec 2172/3294
(66 %)
IPC = infection prevention and control
aother = no obvious reason for isolation (n = 11), behavioural isolation (n = 3), protec
bUsing the 2007 CDC isolation guidelines[1]
cCalculated as the sum of days when isolation rooms (n = 18) were occupied divide
i.e. 6 months to calculate mean or 1 month to calculate minimum and maximum opathogens by day four of hospitalisation). Additional isola-
tion bed days required were calculated by adding the length
of stay for each patient who was identified as having a
missed indication for IPC-isolation. Additional syndromic
bed-days were calculated by adding the number of days
from hospital admission to a negative test result for
specified viral pathogens for each patient (mean interval
was 3.5 days). Additional days of pathogen exposure were
calculated as days of missed isolation plus days of delayed
isolation.
Statistical analysis and ethical approval
Descriptive statistical analyses were performed using
Stata Statistical Software version 13.0 IC (College Station,
TX: StataCorp LP). Median length of stay was compared
using the Mann–Whitney test. A p-value below 0.05 was
considered statistically significant. Ethical approval and wai-
ver of individual informed consent was obtained from the
Human Health Research Ethics committee of Stellenbosch
University (S13/09/171).
Results
Six percent (335/5906) of children admitted during the
study period were placed in isolation. Most isolation
episodes (260/335; 78 %) were for IPC indications.
Community-acquired infections were the predominant
reason for isolation (213/260; 82 %), including TB dis-
ease (130/260; 50 %) and suspected viral infections (75/
260; 29 %) (Table 1). Non-IPC indications for isolation
included nursing considerations (post-operative care orPercentage Interquartile range
100 -
- 6–50
- 2–8
78
14 -
4
4
100
52 -
22
26
Minimum Maximum
225/540 487/558
(42 %) (87 %)
tive isolation (n = 2)
d by [total isolation bed capacity x number of days in the observation period]
ccupancy rates
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havioral or protective isolation. In 11/335 (3 %) epi-
sodes, no indication for isolation was identified.
Children (median age 17 months; IQR 6–50) were iso-
lated for a median of 4 (IQR 2–8) days. Patients isolated
for suspected or confirmed TB stayed longer than pa-
tients with other infectious indications for isolation
(median of 5 versus 3.5 days; p = 0.006). Overall isola-
tion room occupancy was 66 % (2172 occupied/3294
available bed days), but varied significantly by month
with peak usage in winter months (June [76 %], July
[77 %], August [87 %]).
TB disease (130/260; 50 %) was the most frequent
admission diagnosis in IPC-isolated patients [Table 2].
In 55 children (42 %) microbiological confirmation was
obtained; twelve children (9 %) had smear-positive tuber-
culosis (1–99 acid-fast bacilli per high power field) and
12/45 (26 %) children with culture-positive TB had drug-
resistant disease.
The remaining 130/260 (50 %) patients isolated for
IPC indications included suspected or confirmed: viral
respiratory infection (49; 19 %), viral gastrointestinal
infection (20; 8 %), varicella or measles (6; 2.5 %),
nosocomial sepsis (29; 11 %), skin/soft tissue infection
(13; 5 %), hepatitis A (7; 3 %) and meningococcal infection
(6; 2.5 %). In some patients (isolated on clinical suspicion
of infection), laboratory tests revealed no pathogen or a
pathogen not requiring isolation/transmission-based pre-
cautions (Table 2).
Cross-referencing of patient isolation and laboratory
data identified an additional 135 patients warranting
isolation (i.e. missed isolation episodes), with an additional
2054 required isolation bed-days. Of patients with missed
isolation episodes, 43 (32 %) had MDR bacteria [1167
extra bed-days], 16 (12 %) had newly-diagnosed, micro-
biologically confirmed drug-susceptible TB [116 extra
bed-days] and 76 (56 %) had viral pathogens [771 extra
bed-days] (Table 3).
Of 395 laboratory investigations for viral pathogens
warranting isolation: 103 patients with a positive test were
identified (26 % yield). Of these 103 patients, 19 (18 %)
had been isolated from admission, 8 (8 %) had delayed
isolation (mean of 6 days delay) and 76 (74 %) were never
isolated. The eight delayed isolation episodes had a com-
bined 51 days of additional pathogen exposure on the
ward (including hepatitis A, adenovirus, respiratory syn-
cytial virus, parainfluenza 3 and rhinovirus.) A further 226
patients (with 292 negative laboratory tests for viral patho-
gens warranting isolation) would have qualified for syn-
dromic isolation on admission. Implementing syndromic
isolation for these patients would add an additional
990 days of isolation bed demand, increasing the months
where demand would outstrip bed availability from 3 to
5 months in the study period (Fig. 1).Forty patients with 171 patient days of inappropriate
isolation were identified (29 days with no apparent
reason for isolation and 142 days where IPC isolation
was unwarranted i.e. no pathogens were isolated by day
4 of admission). Overall inappropriate isolation days
accounted for 5 % of the available bed days (171/3294).
Although total projected isolation bed-days reflected a
deficit of 761 days (or 123 % projected occupancy) for
missed isolation episodes, the deficit was confined to the
first 3 months of the study period during the winter sea-
son (Fig. 1). The percentage of paediatric admissions
requiring isolation increases from 6 % to 8 % when
patients with missed isolation episodes are included and
to 12 % when including missed isolation and children
investigated for viral pathogens.
During 1223 weekday visits to isolation rooms used
for IPC: alcohol-based handrub was generally available
(89 %); transmission-based precautions were appropri-
ately implemented (71 %) and personal protective equip-
ment was provided (74 %). Of 358 observed interactions
between personnel and isolated patients, hand hygiene
compliance was 65 % and adherence to transmission-
based precautions was 58 %.Discussion
In our study of paediatric isolation room utilization, only
6 % of hospitalized children were placed in isolation.
This contrasts with reported isolation rates of 14–17 %
in high-income countries, where more single rooms and
favourable staffing ratios facilitate greater use of isolation
precautions. However, even in high income countries,
isolation facilities may be under-utilised. Failure to imple-
ment syndromic isolation for suspected viral infections
may also explain our institution’s lower isolation rates,
supported by the finding of many missed isolation oppor-
tunities (particularly among children investigated for viral
respiratory and enteric infections). Another explanation
for our apparently “low” isolation room occupancy and
many “missed” episodes, may be a mismatch between the-
oretical availability of isolation beds and actual availability
of beds. At times of peak isolation demand, even with
overall 66 % occupancy, clinicians may struggle to find an
open isolation bed at the time that the patient requires it.
In keeping with published reports, community-acquired
infections predominated, although TB was the most fre-
quent diagnosis among isolated patients at our institution.
Consequently airborne precautions were the predominant
precaution type implemented, in stark contrast to studies
from high-income settings [4, 6–8]. Since our institution
is a referral centre for complicated and/or drug-resistant
TB, the findings may over-estimate requirement for air-
borne isolation facilities in other low-middle income
paediatric settings. However, South African TB incidence
Table 2 Microbiological isolatesa from patients in isolation for IPC purposes
Category Variable Total (%)
All suspected TB (n = 130) pulmonary TB 118 (91)
extra-pulmonary TBb 12 (9)
TB smear microscopy (n = 130) not tested (diagnosis confirmed at referral hospital) 10 (8)
smear-negative 108 (83)
smear-positive (1–10 AFB/field) 8 (6)
smear-positive (11–99 AFB/field) 4 (3)
Confirmed TBc (n = 55) TB diagnosis confirmed at referral hospital 10
GeneXpert positive 43
TB culture positive 45
Drug-susceptibility profile of culture positive cases (n = 45) Drug-susceptible (DS) 33 (74)
Multidrug-resistant (MDR) 9 (20)
Rifampicin mono-resistant (RMR) 2 (4)
Extensively drug-resistant (XDR) 1 (2)
Total (number DR)
All abacterial/fungal isolates cultured from
patients in isolation (n = 46)
Gram positives
S. aureus total (methicillin-resistant) 7 (2)
Other gram positivesd 4
Gram negatives: Enterobacteriaceae
K. pneumoniae (extended-spectrum B-lactamase) 11 (10)
E. coli (extended-spectrum B-lactamase) 5 (1)
E. cloacae (inducible B-lactamase) 4 (2)
Other Enterobacteriaceaee 4
Gram negatives: Non-fermenters
A. baumanni (multi-drug resistant) 4 (4)
P. aeruginosa (multi-drug resistant) 5 (3)
Others
N. meningitidis 2
B. pertussis (PCR positive) 1
C. albicans 2
Viral pathogens confirmed among patients
in isolation (n = 51)
Gastrointestinal viruses
Hepatitis A 6
Rotavirus 4
Enteric adenovirus 2
Respiratory viruses
Respiratory syncytial virus 15
Adenovirus 12
Rhinovirus 4
Parainfluenza virus 2
Other respiratory virusesf 3
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Table 2 Microbiological isolatesa from patients in isolation for IPC purposes (Continued)
Other
Varicella 2
Rubella 1
aSome patients were isolated on clinical suspicion of sepsis or suspicion of a pathogen warranting isolation, but laboratory tests subsequently confirmed a
pathogen which did not warrant isolation or transmission-based precautions by CDC guidelines[1] e.g. Candida albicans; TB = tuberculosis
bExtra-pulmonary TB: disseminated (7), TB lymphadenitis (3), TB meningitis (2)
cconfirmed TB = geneXpert positive or culture positive for mTB; DR = drug-resistant
dOther gram positives: C. difficile (1), S. pyogenes (1), S. pneumoniae (1), E. faecium (1)
eOther Enterobacteriaceae: S. typhi (1), S. non-typhi (1), C. freundii (1), P. mirabilis (1)
Other respiratory virusesf: Influenza virus (1), Bocavirus (1), Human metapneumovirus (1)
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population) [12] and therefore a strong argument could be
made for provision of airborne isolation at all inpatient
facilities.
Paediatric TB is often considered low-risk for nosoco-
mial transmission, but our cohort of 130 patients had
substantial rates of smear-positive and/or drug-resistant
disease. Children with TB also stayed significantly longer
(increasing TB exposure time on the wards), despite
expedited transfer to a regional TB treatment facility.
Another consideration in TB-endemic settings is theTable 3 Missed opportunitiesa for patient isolation (May – October
Pathogen type and species Mis
Ma
bMDR bacteria
Methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) 3
Carbapenem-resistant A. baumanni (CRAB) 0
MDR P. aeruginosa (MDR PA) 0
Extended spectrum B-lactamase producing (ESBL) Enterobacteriaceae 8
cM. tuberculosis
Drug-susceptible (DS) 2
Drug-resistant (DR) 0
Enteric viruses
Hepatitis A 3
Rotavirus and/or enteric Adenovirus 0
Respiratory viruses
Respiratory syncytial virus A/B 9
Adenovirus 2
dOther respiratory viruses 0
Missed patient isolation episodesa 27
Inappropriate isolation room use (days)e 29
aMissed patient isolation opportunities = patients with pathogens warranting isolati
multiple laboratory isolates of the same pathogen from 1/more sites was considere
bMultidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria isolated from a clinical specimen (blood culture
(including methicillin-resistant S. aureus [MRSA], carbapenem-resistant A. baumanni
producing Enterobacteriaceae [ESBL])
cM. tuberculosis (M.tb) = any form of drug-susceptible (DS) or drug-resistant (DR) M.t
gastrointestinal and respiratory pathogens identified by rapid assays, ELISA or PCR
dOther respiratory viruses warranting isolation and transmission-based precautions
human metapneumovirus
eInappropriate isolation room use = total days when isolation rooms were used for
after laboratory testing identified no pathogens or pathogens that did not warrantpresence of undiagnosed or recently diagnosed pulmonary
TB in caregivers accompanying hospitalized children, with
several documented instances of nosocomial TB transmis-
sion [13–17]. Paediatric wards in TB-endemic settings
should implement routine symptom screening of adult
caregivers and make allowance for additional isolation
space for infectious adults, whenever possible.
Most isolation episodes were for IPC purposes, although
nursing considerations also influenced isolation room use.
Five percent of isolation bed-days were inappropriately
used, highlighting the need for a written guideline on2014)
sed isolation (Non-isolated patients with pathogens warranting isolation)
y June July August Sept. Oct. Study period
0 0 1 2 1 7
1 0 0 0 2 3
0 0 1 2 1 4
8 5 4 1 3 29
0 3 3 3 5 16
0 0 0 0 0 0
4 5 7 2 2 23
2 2 1 0 0 5
5 2 2 0 1 19
2 3 3 3 1 14
3 4 2 2 4 15
25 24 24 15 20 135
77 7 30 27 1 171
on that were not isolated plus days of delay in patients with delayed isolation;
d a single infection episode warranting patient isolation
, urine, tissue, pus, wound swab, catheter tip) as per proposed definitions [12]
[CRAB], MDR P. aeruginosa [MDR PA] and extended spectrum B-lactamase
b isolated on GeneXpert, smear microscopy or TB culture; Viruses included
panels
= human rhinovirus, parainfluenza 1/2/3, Influenza A/B and
inappropriate purposes i.e. without a clinical indication, failure to de-isolate
isolation
Fig. 1 Projected demand for paediatric isolation facilities (May – October 2014). Occupied bed-days = the cumulative daily occupancy of the 18 isolation
beds per month; missed bed-days = duration of hospitalization of patients with pathogens warranting isolation that were not isolated plus days of delay in
patients with late implementation of isolation precautions; estimated syndromic bed-day requirement = number of patients with clinical suspicion of viral
illness but a negative laboratory test/s for viral pathogens (measured as empiric isolation required from day of admission to a negative test result); projected
occupancy = sum of occupied bed-days plus missed bed-days plus estimated syndromic days, minus total bed-days of inappropriate use;
Bed-days of inappropriate isolation room use (not shown in figure) = total days per period where isolation rooms were used for inappropriate purposes i.e.
where there was no clinical indication for isolation or where a patient was not de-isolated after laboratory testing identified no pathogens or pathogens
that did not warrant isolation
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indications for isolation. More importantly, at least 135
opportunities for patient isolation were missed (mostly for
MDR bacterial and viral infections). Notably, there were
few missed isolation episodes for TB, possibly owing to
heightened awareness of isolation recommendations for
TB among clinicians.
If patients with missed isolation episodes had been
appropriately isolated, an overall shortage of 761 isola-
tion bed-days would have been experienced during the
study period (i.e. 123 % projected occupancy). However,
missed isolation episodes also showed seasonal fluctuation
with greatest projected demand over winter (peaking at
208 % or a deficit of 608 bed-days in June 2014). The true
need for isolation beds (actual usage, missed episodes and
syndromic episodes) is underestimated by the laboratory
cross-referencing methodology used, which only identifies
children who had appropriate laboratory investigation/s
requested and whose specimens had a positive yield.
In contrast to a Canadian study [6] with almost uni-
versally correct use of precaution signage and reliable
availability of personal protective equipment (PPE), our
rates of 71 % and 74 % respectively were lower. Ongoing
in-service training of staff and a standardized isolation
policy should improve these rates. Encouragingly, alcohol-based handrub was consistently available (89 %), although
hand hygiene compliance was lower at 65 %. Concurrently
collected hand hygiene audit data on the same wards
using the “secret shoppers” method, recorded compliance
rates of only 41 % (personal communication, Marina
Aucamp, Professional Nurse). The Hawthorne effect
(where individuals modify or improve behaviour in re-
sponse to awareness of being observed) may have resulted
in our “higher” compliance rate, but these rates are con-
cerning given that staff knew they were handling infec-
tious patients.
Paediatric staff at our institution [18] self-report high
rates of adherence (80 %) to transmission-based precau-
tion recommendations, but observed compliance was
low (58 %). Although appropriate PPE was sometimes
unavailable, when it was reliably supplied staff either
took no precautions or applied only certain aspects. The
additional time and effort required to nurse patients
under isolation precautions is well-described [19] and
may discourage compliance, together with staff shortages
and a lack of education about isolation recommendations.
Limitations of this study include: the short duration
(6-months) with inability to estimate annual isolation
bed demand and evaluate impact of seasonal disease
fluctuations; the tertiary hospital setting (with 18
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paediatric wards in low-middle income settings; the ob-
servation process (Hawthorne effect) which may have in-
creased staff compliance; the method for identification
of missed isolation episodes based on laboratory isolation
of specific pathogens, potentially underestimating the true
demand for isolation (particularly if syndromic isolation
were to be implemented).
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study of paediatric
isolation utilization has relevance for our own institution
and paediatric wards in other low-resource, TB-endemic
settings. To accommodate for peaks in demand and fa-
cilitate implementation of syndromic isolation, we
propose that new paediatric facilities in our setting
have a minimum of 40 % of available beds as single or
double cohort isolation rooms. Provision for airborne
precautions (needed for half of all isolation episodes in
this setting), should be prioritised in new facilities and
for renovations of existing paediatric wards in TB-
endemic settings. Sufficient provision should be made
for administrative/office space during design of new wards
or facilities, to avoid isolation rooms being inappropriately
utilized for non-clinical activities. Syndromic isolation for
suspected infection should be implemented (with prompt
de-isolation after negative laboratory tests), to reduce
risk of infection transmission on children’s wards in
low-resource settings. To ensure rational and co-ordinated
use of isolation beds in our 300-bedded children’s hospital,
nursing or infection control practitioners could be trained
as isolation bed managers. Staff education, written policies
and active management of scarce paediatric isolation
resources are required.Conclusion
Most children admitted to isolation facilities in our
TB-endemic setting require airborne precautions. Missed
opportunities for patient isolation are common, and could
be reduced by implementation of syndromic isolation. Ac-
tual and projected demand for isolation facilities exceeds
available capacity over the winter season.Abbreviations
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